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DOUGLAS COUNTY V. BABBITT AND THE NEW DIS-
PLACEMENT EXEMPTION: NEPA LOSES MORE
GROUND
Erika Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)' and made environmental protection a part of the mandate of
every federal agency and department.2 Specifically, NEPA was designed
to ensure:
that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environ-
mental impacts [of proposed federal actions]; [and] ... that the relevant
information will be made available to the larger audience that may also
play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of
that decision
To carry out its over-arching policy of ensuring that agencies include an
examination of environmental consequences in their decisionmaking pro-
cesses, NEPA requires agencies to comply with a number of procedural
requirements designed to assess the environmental impacts of their ac-
tions.4 The heart of NEPA's procedural requirements is the environmental
impact statement (EIS). NEPA requires that:
to the fullest extent possible.., all agencies of the Federal government
shall ... include in every.., major Federal action(s) significantly af-
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Montana School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
2. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1.04 (2d ed. 1992) (citing Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
3. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2).
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fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement...
on the environmental impact of the proposed action .... [and] altema-
tives to the proposed action .... '
NEPA does not explicitly exempt any federal agency action from its
requirements.6 However, over the years Congress and the courts have
created exemptions for a limited number of circumstances. For the most
part, these exemptions represent an evolutionary process of defining and
redefining NEPA in an effort to give it the utility and meaning Congress
intended. However, recent cases suggest that this tinkering with NEPA
may have gone too far. Environmentalists, county control proponents,8
and the federal government alike have used various NEPA exemption
arguments to either further their interests, or to obstruct actions adverse to
their interests.9 The granting of NEPA exemptions in these cases necessar-
ily raises a difficult question: Are the exemptions part of the evolutionary
process of strengthening and fine-tuning NEPA, or do the exemptions
represent a whole new evolutionary process-the gradual erosion of NEPA
by its numerous exemptions?
The Ninth Circuit recently faced this question in the case Douglas
County v. Babbitt. The issue in Douglas County was whether NEPA
applied to critical habitat designation under the Endangered Species Act"'
(ESA)." The court built upon the reasoning underlying two prior NEPA
exemption cases, Merrell v. Thomas,3 and Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Andrus, 4 and granted NEPA exemption for ESA critical habitat designa-
tions. The Court held that ESA critical habitat procedures "displaced"
NEPA procedures, and therefore, NEPA did not apply to critical habitat
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). For a complete list of the required contents of an EIS, see 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
7. For an indepth review of all statutory and judicial exemptions, see MANDELKER, supra note
2, § 5.03.
8. The county control movement is also known as the "wise use" movement, or "custom and
culture" movement, and refers to attempts by landowners, logging companies, and families dependent
on agriculture and the forest products industry to exert management authority and traditional uses on
public lands by and through local governments. See John W. Hart, National Forest Planning: An Op-
portunity for Local Governments to Influence Federal Land Use, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 137 n.13
(1995).
9. See MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 11.02; see also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("An impact statement requirement presents the danger that oppo-
nents of environmental protection would use the issue of compliance with any impact statement as a
tactic of litigation and delay.").
10. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
12. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1501.
13. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
14. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
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designation.'" As a result of this holding the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) is not obligated to draft an EIS when making critical habitat
designations.' 6
The displacement rule has never before emerged in the progeny of
NEPA exemption cases. This Note attempts to shed light on how the court
reached the displacement exemption, whether the displacement exemption
carved a new NEPA exemption or simply restated an existing exemption,
and finally, how the displacement exemption might affect the future prac-
tice of NEPA law. Part II of this Note reviews the facts and procedural
history of Douglas County. Part II provides a discussion of the legal
background of NEPA exemptions. Part IV contains an analysis of how the
displacement rule fits into the context of NEPA exemptions and how it
might affect the future of NEPA law. Finally, Part V provides perspective
on whether the Douglas County decision as a whole will advance or frus-
trate the purposes of NEPA.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF DOUGLAS COUNTY
Douglas County is one of many cases in the ongoing saga involving
the Northern Spotted Owl (owl) and the timber industry. In 1987, a num-
ber of conservation organizations petitioned to list the owl as endangered
or threatened both in the Olympic Peninsula in Washington and in the
Oregon Coast Range. 7 Initially, the Secretary found that the petition was
not warranted." However, in response to litigation challenging this find-
ing, the Secretary listed the owl as a threatened species on June 26,
1990.'
Upon listing the owl, the Secretary deferred concurrent designation of
critical habitat on grounds that such critical habitat was not "determinable"
at that time?" Again, litigation challenging this finding ensued and result-
ed in a court order compelling designation of critical habitat.2'
On May 6, 1991, the Secretary issued his proposed regulation desig-
nating 11,639,195 acres of federal, state, tribal, and private lands as criti-
cal habitat, and announced he would hold public hearings and take com-
15. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1502.
16. Id.
17. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
18. Id. at 481. The ESA directs the Secretary to make a finding as to whether the petition is
"warranted" based on the information presented. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
19. 48 F.3d at 1498. The owl is listed at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1994) (proposal for listing at 55
Fed. Reg. 26,194 (1990)).
20. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 623 (W.D. Wash. 1991). The ESA re-
quires "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable" critical habitat to be designated concurrently
with the listing of a species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
21. 758 F. Supp. at 629-30.
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ments on the proposal."2 The ESA requires the Secretary to designate
habitat "on the basis of the best scientific data available" and to take "into
consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of
specifying any particular area as critical habitat."23 In making the pro-
posed designation, the Secretary relied on a preliminary economic analysis
prepared by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).24
The Secretary included in his May 6, 1991 proposal an announcement
that he did not need to prepare an environmental assessment' for the
designation of critical habitat.26 The Secretary cited two authorities on
which he based his presumption. First, he cited Pacific Legal Foundation
for the holding that NEPA did not apply to the listing of endangered spe-
cies. Second, he cited a letter from the federal Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ) s urging the Secretary to stop preparing EISs for ac-
tions under section 4 of the ESA.29 On May 30, 1991, the plaintiff,
Douglas County (County), submitted its formal comments to the Secretary,
arguing that the Secretary was obligated to comply with NEPA by prepar-
ing an EIS."
After the initial comment period, the FWS prepared a second eco-
nomic analysis report in which it included an analysis of employment and
revenue losses in the timber industry in each county affected by the desig-
nation. Based on this analysis and comments received, the Secretary
issued a revised designation proposal eliminating all private, tribal, and
some state owned lands, reducing the critical habitat designation to
8,240,160 acres.32 Upon issuing the revised proposal, the Secretary re-
opened the comment period and reaffirmed that no EIS was necessary.33
In January of 1992, after the close of the second comment period, the
FWS prepared its final economic analysis and the Secretary issued the
22. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 20,816 (1991)).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
24. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1472 (D. Or. 1992).
25. An environmental assessment is a NEPA document used to determine whether the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed federal action is of such magnitude as to warrant preparation of an
EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1994). For purposes of this Note, EIS will be used to generically refer to
NEPA compliance documents.
26. 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 20,824 (1991)).
27. Id.
28. The CEQ's interpretation of NEPA "is entitled to substantial deference." Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
29. 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983)). Section 4 of the ESA provides for the
determination and listing of endangered and threatened species and for the designation of critical habi-
tat. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
30. 48 F.3d at 1498.
31. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. at 1473.
32. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002 (1991)).
33. Id.
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final regulation, reducing the designation of critical habitat to approxi-
mately 6.9 million acres of purely federal land.34 On September 25, 1991,
the County filed suit against the Secretary alleging he failed to comply
with NEPA 5 The County asserted that the Secretary must prepare an
EIS because, it argued, designating critical habitat qualified as a "major
federal action" to which NEPA's procedural requirements apply. 6 In re-
sponse, the Secretary contended that NEPA did not apply to the designa-
tion of critical habitat "for the same reasons the court in Pacific Legal
Foundation held" that NEPA did not apply to the listing determination.'
Relying on Pacific Legal Foundation, the Secretary argued that Congress
did not intend for NEPA to apply to "environment-enhancing agencies.""
The district court rejected the Secretary's arguments and granted
summary judgment for the County."' The district court did not find de-
terminative the Sixth Circuit's holding in Pacific Legal Foundation that
Congress intended to exempt from NEPA agencies acting under environ-
ment-enhancing statutes.' The district court distinguished listing determi-
nations from critical habitat designations and stated that "the rationales for
the court's conclusion in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, are simply
not present when the reasoning is examined in terms of critical habitat
designation."'" The district court declined to depart from the express lan-
guage of NEPA and declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's holding stating,
"[T]he Ninth Circuit has taken the position that NEPA applies to every
major federal action absent a clear and unavoidable statutory conflict."'42
The district court ordered that the final designation of critical habitat be
set aside until the Secretary complied with NEPA, but stayed the order
pending appeal.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the
NEPA issue and held that NEPA does not apply to critical habitat designa-
tion under the ESA because:
(1) Congress intended that ESA critical habitat procedures displace
the NEPA requirements;'
34. Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992)).
35. Id. at 1474. The County raised several other claims beyond the scope of this Note against
the Secretary.
36. Id. at 1477.
37. Id. at 1478.
38. Id. at 1478, 1481 (citing Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 838 n.1 1).
39. Id. at 1485.
40. Id. at 1481-83.
41. Id. at 1483.
42. Id. at 1482.
43. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1499.
44. Id. at 1503.
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(2) NEPA does not apply to actions that do not change the physical
environment;45 and
(3) the ESA furthers the goals of NEPA without requiring an EIS.'
This holding can be best understood in the context of prior law exempting
agencies from NEPA compliance.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF NEPA EXEMPTIONS
A. The Functional Equivalence Exemption
The evolution of NEPA exemptions began with the functional equiva-
lence exemption, first articulated in 1973 in Portland Cement Association
v. Ruckelshaus.47 In that case, the court concluded that the EPA's require-
ments under section 111 of the Clean Air Act-imposing emission stan-
dards reflecting "the best system of emission reduction" and "taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction" -was the functional
equivalent of the NEPA requirement that agencies consider the environ-
mental impacts of their actions. '9 The court reasoned that complying with
section 111 would necessarily require preparation of a statement similar to
an EIS setting forth the environmental considerations." Further, the court
reasoned that the comments submitted by other agencies concerning the
proposed emissions standards would be part of the public record and
would thereby afford the public participation contemplated by NEPA.5' In
finding the necessary functional equivalence between NEPA and section
111 of the Clean Air Act, the court held:
Although the rule-making process may not import the complete advan-
tages of the structured determinations of NEPA into the decision-making
of EPA, it does, in our view strike a workable balance between some of
the advantages and disadvantages of NEPA.2
The Portland Cement court also addressed a corollary to the function-
al equivalence exemption. This corollary espouses the principle that specif-
ic statutes prevail over general statutes addressing the same subject.53 In
the context of environmental statutes, the corollary indicates that legisla-
45. Id. at 1505.
46. Id. at 1506.
47. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1) (1994).
49. Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 384 ("What is decisive ... is ... that section 11I of the
Clean Air Act, properly construed, requires the functional equivalent of a NEPA impact statement.").
50. Id. at 385.
51. Id. at 386.
52. Id.
53. See Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. Environmental Protection Agency, 911 F.2d 499, 504
(1 lth Cir. 1990).
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tion designed to address specific environmental concerns, such as the
Clean Air Act, is not subject to legislation designed to address general
environmental concerns, such as NEPA.
54
In addressing this corollary, the court undertook a review of legisla-
tive history to determine whether Congress intended a broad NEPA ex-
emption for agencies operating under specific environment-enhancing
statutes.55 However, finding the legislative history thoroughly ambigu-
ous 6 the court refrained from making any broad NEPA exemption for
environment-enhancing statutes.57 Instead, the court confined its holding
to "a narrow exemption from NEPA applicable to determinations under
section 111 of the Clean Air Act."'5 As support for this narrow exemp-
tion, the court discussed both the functional equivalence of NEPA and
section 111 as outlined above. 9 The court further indicated that although
NEPA was designed to protect the environment, it may actually hinder
those agencies charged with protecting the environment as the EIS pro-
vides opponents of environmental protection a tactic of litigation and de-
lay.6
In response to the Portland Cement holding, Congress subsequently
provided the EPA a statutory exemption from NEPA compliance for cer-
tain actions taken under the Clean Air Act." Congress has also provided
similar statutory exemptions for other environmental regulatory programs
including the Clean Water Act. 2
In the functional equivalence exemption cases, it is difficult to ascer-
tain whether the courts place more weight on the functional equivalence
argument or on the broad corollary that NEPA need not apply to agencies
already charged with protecting the environment. However, one court
54. See 486 F.2d at 381 ("[T]here is a serious question whether NEPA is applicable to envi-
ronmentally protective regulatory agencies"). See also id. at 383-84 ("[N]EPA operates, in protection
of the environment, by a broadly applicable measure that only provides a first step. The goal of pro-
tecting the environment requires more than NEPA provides, i.e. specific assignment of duties to pro-
tection agencies, in certain areas identified by Congress as requiring extra protection.").
55. Id. at 381-84.
56. Id. at 383 & n.31.
57. Id. at 387.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 384-87.
60. Id. at 384.
61. MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 5.03[8]. The statutory exemption in the Clean Air Act is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1) (1994) ("No action taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed
a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning
of [NEPA].'). See also the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act at 15 U.S.C. §
793(c)(1) (restating Clean Air Act exemption).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1994) ("[N]o action of the Administrator taken pursuant to this
chapter shall be deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment within the meaning of [NEPA].").
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emphatically stated its position that an agency's environment-enhancing
nature should be given no weight in determining whether a functional
equivalence exemption is warranted:
The mere fact an agency has been given the role of implementing an
environmental statute is insufficient to invoke the "functional equivalent"
exception. To extend the doctrine to all cases in which a federal agency
administers a statute which was designed to preserve the environment
would considerably weaken NEPA, rendering it inapplicable in many
situations.63
The functional equivalence exemption represented a departure from
the strict interpretation that NEPA applies to all federal acts absent
Congress' express statutory exemption. Since the 1973 Portland Cement
decision, several courts have granted functional equivalence exemptions.
However, as Jones v. Gordon and the cases discussed below indicate,
courts are still divided on how to best interpret and apply the functional
equivalence exemption. One legal scholar notes that courts have typically
limited the functional equivalence exemption to programs administered by
the EPA only.64 Perhaps this is because courts acknowledge the warning
expressed in Jones, that broadly interpreting and applying the functional
equivalence exemption only serves to weaken and trivialize NEPA. Fur-
ther, the exemption fails to give effect to Congress' express mandate that
NEPA applies to all major agency actions significantly affecting the quali-
ty of the human environment.
B. The Irreconcilable Conflict Exemption
Aside from the functional equivalence exemptions, other judicial
exemptions emerged out of the litigation following NEPA's enactment. Of
particular significance is the irreconcilable conflict exemption, which
courts have used to grant a NEPA exemption when an agency's statutory
obligations preclude compliance with NEPA.65 The irreconcilable conflict
exemption first emerged from the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Flint Ridge Development Company v. Scenic Rivers Association of
Oklahoma.'
In Flint Ridge the Court considered whether the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) was required to file an EIS in con-
nection with actions under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act6'
63. Jones v. Gordon, 621 F. Supp. 7, 13 (D. Alaska 1985).
64. MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 5.03[8].
65. MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 5.03[51[a].
66. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1994).
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(Disclosure Act)." The Disclosure Act required developers of unim-
proved land subdivisions to disclose information to potential buyers re-
garding such information as a subdivision's access, utilities, and proposed
improvements. 9 HUD argued that the Disclosure Act's thirty-day time
limit for reviewing a developer's disclosure statement made preparation of
an EIS impossible." The Court agreed, finding that the thirty-day limit
for HUD's review of disclosure statements was mandatory and was intend-
ed to protect developers from costly delays.7' The Court held that activi-
ties under the Disclosure Act were exempt from NEPA because the time
constraints under the Disclosure Act presented an "irreconcilable and fun-
damental conflict" with the EIS requirement.'
A later case, Jones v. Gordon,73 qualified the irreconcilable conflict
rule. In Jones, the court held that the ninety-day time limit for granting or
denying a permit to capture whales under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act74 (MMPA) did not present an irreconcilable conflict with the EIS
requirement and therefore did not warrant NEPA exemption 5 Relying on
language in MMPA giving the Secretary of Commerce authority to "pre-
scribe such procedures as are necessary to carry out this section," the court
found that the time period was discretionary and could be delayed in order
to prepare an ES.76 The court distinguished Flint Ridge, stating that un-
like the time period of the MMPA, the time period of the Disclosure Act,
at issue in Flint Ridge, was mandatory once triggered, and could not be
delayed because that statute was designed to "protect developers from
costly delays" in HUD's approval process.'
Flint Ridge and Jones are significant because they not only estab-
lished the irreconcilable conflict rule, but represented another departure
from Congress' express mandate that NEPA applies to all major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Al-
though Flint Ridge was the first articulation of the irreconcilable conflict
exemption, Jones was especially important as it drew a distinction between
mandatory and discretionary duties under a particular statute and narrowly
confined the irreconcilable conflict exemption to be applicable only to
those statutes in which mandatory actions conflicted with NEPA compli-
68. Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 778.
69. Id. at 779.
70. Id. at 787.
71. Id. at 790-91.
72. Id. at 788.
73. 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1421 (1994).
75. Jones, 792 F.2d at 825.
76. Id. at 826 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(1)).
77. Id.
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ance.
However, a line of cases later emerged that expanded the reach of the
irreconcilable conflict rule.78 One of these cases, Pacific Legal Founda-
tion, addressed whether the absence of agency authority to consider envi-
ronmental factors when listing endangered species under ESA constituted
an irreconcilable conflict precluding preparation of an EIS.79
C. Expansion of the Irreconcilable Conflict Rule
1. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus
In Pacific Legal Foundation, the Sixth Circuit confronted whether
NEPA applied to the process of listing threatened or endangered species
under the ESA.8" The plaintiff, Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), argued
that since Congress had not fashioned an exemption in the ESA, and since
the ESA listing procedures contained no time constraints presenting an ir-
reconcilable conflict, the Secretary must comply with NEPA.8" Further,
NEPA's language requiring compliance "to the fullest extent possible" was
not a "loophole," but a mandate requiring federal agencies to comply
absent a statutory exemption or an irreconcilable conflict. 2
The Secretary argued that the ESA gave him no authority or discre-
tion to consider environmental factors when listing a species, and thus
presented an irreconcilable conflict warranting NEPA exemption.83 To
support this argument, the Secretary cited language in section 4 of the
ESA requiring him to list a species only on the basis of the "best scientific
and commercial data available," and upon a finding of at least one of five
factors, which are: (A) the present or threatened destruction, modification,
or curtailment of [the species'] habitat or range; (B) overutilization for
commercial, sporting, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or
predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E)
other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.8 4 Fur-
ther, the Secretary made the policy argument that requiring an EIS for
listing determinations defeated the purpose of the ESA since the species
would not be protected and may even be destroyed during preparation of
the EIS.8s
The Sixth Circuit broadened the definition of irreconcilable conflict
78. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976).
79. Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d 829, 831-32 (6th Cir. 1981).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 831-32.
82. Id. at 833.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 835 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)).
85. Id. at 832.
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and held that regardless of the absence of a statutory exemption or time
constraint, NEPA conflicted with the ESA for other reasons, therefore an
EIS was not required when listing threatened or endangered species. 6
The reasoning on which the court based its broadened version of the irrec-
oncilable conflict exemption is four-fold: (1) filing an EIS would not serve
the purposes of ESA; (2) filing an EIS would not serve the purposes for
filing such a statement under NEPA; (3) the Secretary's action in listing
species furthers the purposes of NEPA even without filing an EIS; and (4)
Congress did not intend that NEPA apply to agencies charged with pro-
tecting the environment.'
First, the court found that filing an EIS for listing determinations
would not serve the purposes of the ESA."8 The court agreed with the
Secretary that he did not have the authority to consider any factors other
than the five listed in section 4 of the ESA."9 To support this assertion,
the court cited both NEPA and a Supreme Court decision9 for the rule
that "nothing in [NEPA] shall affect the specific statutory obligations of
any federal agency to comply with criteria or standards of environmental
quality. '91
Second, the court found that filing an EIS for listing determinations
would not serve the purposes for filing such a statement under NEPA.9
The court noted that NEPA was designed to ensure that agencies consider
the environmental impact of their actions, yet "the statutory mandate of
ESA prevents the Secretary from considering the environmental impact
when listing" species.93 Thus, the court reasoned, when an agency has no
authority to consider environmental factors an EIS is useless and cannot
serve the purposes of NEPA.94 Additionally, the court stated that an EIS
is not necessary to consider the priority of listing a particular species since
Congress has already afforded endangered species preservation the highest
priority.9" This further persuaded the court that filing an EIS for the list-
86. Id. at 835.
87. Id. at 835-40.
88. Id. at 835.
89. Id. See also id. at 839 n.12 (citing legislative history indicating Secretary's duty to list
species based on the five factors is mandatory, not discretionary).
90. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (stating that "NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute
and thereby create powers not created in the agency's enabling legislation").
91. Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 836 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4334). See also United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973) ("NEPA was not
intended to repeal by implication any other statute.").
92. 657 F.2d at 836.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 838. The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he plain intent of Con-
19961
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ing of endangered species would not serve the purposes it was designed to
serve.
96
Third, the court found that listing endangered species furthers the
purpose of NEPA even without filing an EIS. 97 The court cited NEPA's
congressional declaration of policy and stated that NEPA's purposes were
to preserve and enhance the environment and to make federal agencies
"trustees of the environment." 98 The court reasoned that by listing endan-
gered species, the Secretary was working to preserve the environment and
acting in the spirit of NEPA as the trustee of a natural resource. 99 The
court concluded with reasoning reminiscent of the corollary to the func-
tional equivalence argument" stating that the Secretary is charged solely
with protecting the environment, and that preparing an EIS would only
hinder the Secretary's efforts in attaining this goal." 1
Finally, the court in Pacific Legal Foundation found that Congress
did not intend that NEPA apply to agencies charged with protecting the
environment.' The court first relied on the legislative history of NEPA
indicating Congress did not intend to have NEPA change the manner in
which agencies charged with protecting the environment carry out their re-
sponsibilities. 3 The court next relied on the legislative history of the
ESA, which indicated that Congress intended to make the listing of threat-
ened or endangered species a mandatory act, not a discretionary one, and
intended to make the listing dependent on the five factors found in section
4 of the ESA, not on the environmental impact concerns contained in an
EIS."° Further, the court highlighted the legislative history of the 1978
amendments to the ESA indicating that although some witnesses wanted to
introduce some flexibility into the ESA by imposing the EIS requirement
on the Secretary, Congress declined to do so.' Instead, Congress chose
to address concerns of the ESA's rigidity by creating a committee to grant
exemptions,"° and the Secretary's mandatory duty to list endangered
gress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt species extinction, whatever the cost." Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 154 (1978).
96. 657 F.2d at 838.
97. Id. at 837.
98. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)-(c)).
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
101. 657 F.2d at 837.
102. Id. at 838.
103. Id. at 838 n.ll (citing 115 CONG. REc. 40,925 (1969)).
104. Id. at 838-39 & n.12 (citing H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1973)).
105. Id. at 838-39 & n.13 (citing Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S.
2899 Before the Subcommittee on Resource Protection of the Senate Committee on Environmental and
Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1978)).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).
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species was left intact. 7
Pacific Legal Foundation is significant because the court rejected the
narrow interpretation of the irreconcilable conflict rule that statutory ex-
emptions and time constraints afforded the only exemptions from NEPA.
Rather, the court broadened the Flint Ridge meaning of irreconcilable
conflict to include not only timetable conflicts, but also the absence of
authority in an agency's enabling legislation to consider environmental
impacts. Pacific Legal Foundation was primarily an irreconcilable conflict
exemption case. However, both the court's comparison of the purposes
served by NEPA and the ESA, and the court's reliance on congressional
intent, hinted at the possibility of newly emerging grounds for NEPA ex-
emption.
Merrell v. Thomas'. soon followed and seemed to fulfill that
prophecy. By comparing the purposes served by NEPA and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),'" and by focusing
on congressional intent, the Merrell court held that Congress intended to
exempt FIFRA from NEPA because Congress purposefully designed
FIFRA procedures to be materially different from those of NEPA."'
2. Merrell v. Thomas: Congressional Intent
The court in Merrell was asked to determine whether the EPA must
comply with NEPA when registering pesticides under FIFRA."' To
reach its conclusion that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply to
FIFRA registration, the court traced the legislative history of FIFRA and
its subsequent amendments." 2 The court noted that whenever Congress
revisited FIFRA, it chose specifically to accommodate environmental
concerns by amending the statute rather than requiring NEPA compli-
ance.
113
The court first considered the motives underlying the 1972 and 1978
amendments to FIFRA." 4 In 1972, the public became increasingly con-
cerned over FIFRA's failures to adequately inform them of pesticide regis-
tration, and to adequately factor environmental concerns in pesticide regis-
tration standards and procedures." ' However, the agricultural and chemi-
107. 657 F.2d at 839 (citing S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7, 10 (1978)).
108. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6y (1994).
110. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 778.
111. Id. at 776.
112. Id. at777-81.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 778.
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cal industries opposed any change to FIFRA on grounds that releasing
certain information violated their rights to non-disclosure of essential test
data and trade secrets.'
1 6
In the 1972 amendments to FIFRA, Congress struck a compromise,
the essential elements of which follow: Congress (1) added two environ-
mental criteria to its registration standards; (2) broadened the standard for
denial of registration to include "unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment;"'' 7 (3) required the EPA to publish in the Federal Register
notice of applications for registration of pesticides containing a "new
active ingredient" or "changed use pattern" before making its decision;" 8
(4) required the EPA to act "as expeditiously as possible," expecting a
decision within three months of application; " 9 and (5) required the EPA
to inform the public, within thirty days of the decision, the information on
which it based registration of a pesticide, excluding test data and trade
secrets."0 This last provision, excluding essential data and trade secrets,
induced much litigation, which motivated Congress to again revisit FIFRA
in 1978.121
In the 1978 amendments, Congress responded to the flood of litiga-
tion by creating a "conditional registration procedure" that permitted the
EPA to waive or postpone some data disclosure requirements.' 2 In addi-
tion, Congress rewrote the trade secret disclosure section of FIFRA to
accommodate the competing interests of the public and the pesticide in-
dustry.2 3
In reaching its decision in Merrell, the court emphasized that Con-
gress established a comprehensive scheme for the registration of pesticides
that was very different from NEPA in order to specifically accommodate
the needs of competing interests.2 4 Among several illustrations of how
the FIFRA amendments conflicted with NEPA, the court in particular
distinguished FIFRA's "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment"
standard from NEPA's "significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment" standard."n Most emphatically, the court hit home the idea
that "[t]o apply NEPA to FIFRA's registration process would sabotage the
116. Id. at 778-79.
117. Id. at 780.
118. Id. at 778.
119. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 779.
122. Id. (citing Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 6, 92 Stat. 819, 825-26)
123. Id. at 779 (citing H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1991-92).
124. Id. at 778-81.
125. Id. at 780.
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delicate machinery that Congress designed to register new pesticides."'' 6
The court indicated in dicta that FIFRA may have provided the "functional
equivalence" of NEPA. 7 However, the court deemed it sufficient to
base FIFRA's exemption from NEPA on congressional intent alone, stat-
ing "[w]hile we hesitate to adopt the 'functional equivalence' rationale, we
are confident that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply to FIFRA regis-
trations. ' ' a
Flint Ridge, Pacific Legal Foundation, and Merrell are significant
milestones in the evolutionary process of defining how Congress intended
NEPA to affect agency decisionmaking. Douglas County has emerged as
another significant milestone, adding the displacement exemption to the
list of NEPA exemptions.
IV. DOUGLAS CoUNTY AND THE "NEW" DISPLACEMENT RULE
The application of NEPA to critical habitat designation was a ques-
tion of first impression.'29 The court in Paciflc Legal Foundation sug-
gested in dicta that designation of critical habitat would be exempt from
NEPA because the ESA's critical habitat designation procedures offered
the functional equivalent of NEPA procedures. 3 However, the court in
Pacific Legal Foundation did not rule on this question because the ESA's
listing procedures, not habitat designation, were at issue. Douglas County
presented an opportunity for the Secretary to fill in the blank that the
Pacific Legal Foundation dicta left open and to make the position part of
Ninth Circuit law.
The heart of the Secretary's argument to the district court was that
the Secretary "is exempt from NEPA when designating critical habitat 'for
the same reasons the Court in Pacific Legal Foundation held [the Secre-
tary] was exempt from NEPA when [he] conducted a listing determina-
tion."""' Recall that in Pacific Legal Foundation the court's reasons for
exempting ESA listing determinations from NEPA were: (1) filing an EIS
would not serve the purposes of ESA; (2) filing an EIS would not serve
the purposes for filing such a statement under NEPA; (3) the Secretary's
action in listing species furthers the purposes of NEPA even without filing
an EIS; and (4) Congress did not intend that NEPA apply to agencies
126. Id. at 779.
127. Id. at 781.
128. Id.
129. Douglas County, 48 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995).
130. Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 835.
131. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1478 (D. Or. 1992) (citing Defendant's Reply
Memorandum at 12).
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charged with protecting the environment.'32 Essentially, the Secretary uti-
lized the reasoning in Pacific Legal Foundation and applied each of its
points to Douglas County to argue for NEPA exemption for critical habitat
designation.'33
The district court's rejection of Pacific Legal Foundation as contrary
to Ninth Circuit law called upon the Ninth Circuit to affirmatively state its
position. The Ninth Circuit rejected the County's assertion that only
statutory exemptions and time constraints afforded NEPA exemption,
holding that other reasons justified NEPA exemption for critical habitat
designation.'34 Those reasons are: (1) the ESA displaces NEPA; (2)
NEPA does not apply to actions that preserve the physical environment;
and (3) the ESA furthers the goals of NEPA without requiring an EIS. 3 '
Given the dicta in Pacific Legal Foundation, one would expect the
court to have resolved the question by granting the irreconcilable conflict
exemption that emerged from Pacific Legal Foundation. This would have
been easily accomplished through a direct, step-by-step grafting of the
decision in Pacific Legal Foundation on to the situation in Douglas
County. However, while the court did rely on Pacific Legal Foundation
for its conclusion that the ESA itself furthers the goals of NEPA, 3 6 the
court primarily relied on Merrell and congressional intent to hold that the
ESA displaces NEPA and that NEPA does not apply to actions that pre-
serve the environment.'37 The court made a lengthy comparison of the
legislative histories of FIFRA and the ESA in an effort to analogize Doug-
las County to Merrell, and then advanced what appears to be a new NEPA
exemption-the displacement exemption.3 In short, it appears the court
went through the back door when it could have easily gone through the
front. It is peculiar that a court would favor Merrell, a case not directly on
point, over Pacific Legal Foundation, a case closely on point.
How and why then did the court reach the displacement rule? Is the
displacement rule a new ground for NEPA exemption, or simply a restate-
ment of existing grounds? Will the displacement rule frustrate or advance
the purposes of NEPA?
132. See supra text accompanying notes 87-107.
133. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1477-83.
134. Id. at 1502.
135. Id. at 1502, 1505-06.
136. Id. at 1506-07.
137. Id. at 1502-06.
138. Id. at 1502-05.
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A. Why Displacement?
In answering the first question, an examination of the court's Merrell
analysis is helpful. The court analogized Douglas County to Merrell by
drawing parallels between the legislative history of critical habitat desig-
nation under the ESA and the legislative history of pesticide registration
under FIFRA. 39 The court found that, like FIFRA, Congress amended
the ESA in 1978 to strike a compromise between competing interests'
4
Congress amended the ESA to specifically accommodate the interests by
allowing the Secretary to consider economic impacts when designating
critical habitat, and by imposing more stringent notice provisions.14' The
court compared the ESA to FIFRA and applied the "Merrellism" that
Congress "carefully crafted" a solution within the ESA itself rather than
require NEPA compliance for critical habitat designation. 42
Continuing the analogy, the court lifted several other points from
Merrell. For example, the court stated that the amended notice provisions
for critical habitat designation made NEPA notice provisions
"superfluous."'43 Likewise, the court seized on the notion that the 1978
ESA amendments represented "a compromise between disparate points of
view,"'" and that to apply NEPA to the ESA would "sabotage the deli-
cate machinery that Congress designed" for the designation of critical
habitat.45 Finally, the court highlighted the fact that in 1988, seven years
after Pacific Legal Foundation was decided, Congress revisited the ESA
and specifically chose not to amend it to require NEPA compliance.'"
As in Merrell, the court inferred that Congress' inaction indicated that it
accepted the Pacific Legal Foundation holding and did not intend to apply
NEPA to actions taken under the ESA. 47
A close reading of the opinion reveals the most plausible reason for
the Douglas County displacement ruling. While the Douglas County court
may have agreed with the dicta in Pacific Legal Foundation,'" the court
hit an obstacle-the Pacific Legal Foundation dicta rested upon the func-
tional equivalence rule as a basis for NEPA exemption, but in Douglas
County the Secretary did not raise the functional equivalence argu-
139. Id. at 1503.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9463-64).
145. Id. (quoting Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779).
146. Id. at 1504.
147. Id.
148. See text accompanying note 130.
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ment."'49 Thus, unable to rely on the dicta and apply Pacific Legal Foun-
dation directly, the Douglas County court relied heavily on Merrell and
supported its holding with the displacement rule.
B. New Grounds for Exemption?
In answering the second question, whether the displacement rule is
new ground for NEPA exemption or simply a restatement of existing
grounds, it is helpful to review the County's objections to the displace-
ment argument. The County challenged the court's use of displacement,
arguing that displacement was just another term for functional equiva-
lence. 5 The County asserted that although Merrell did not explicitly
reach a functional equivalence exemption, its reasoning essentially fol-
lowed functional equivalence analysis.'' The Merrell court stated:
Our position that NEPA does not apply to pesticides registered under
FIFRA has been taken by other courts as well. Speaking in terms of the
"functional equivalence" of the EPA's procedures to NEPA's procedures,
these courts conclude that formal compliance with NEPA would be
wasteful and redundant.1 52
The County further asserted that other cases refer to Merrell as a function-
al equivalence case."3 The County then argued that because displace-
ment is essentially the same as functional equivalence, and because func-
tional equivalence was never raised in the district court proceedings, the
court was prohibited from addressing it on appeal.1
54
The County's arguments did not persuade the court. In an apparent
attempt to gloss over the County's objections, the court narrowly distin-
guished the displacement rule from the functional equivalence rule. The
court concluded that the first asserts that Congress intended to displace
one procedure with another, while the second asserts that one process
requires the same steps as another. 5 1
The court's distinction between displacement and functional equiva-
lence seems so minute and wanting of true substance as to warrant no
distinction. The distinction is especially questionable when considering
that the Douglas County court, in order to hold consistently with the dicta
149. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10.
150. Id. See also Appellee's Brief to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals at 23, Douglas County
(Nos. 93-36013, 93-36016) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
151. Appellee's Brief, supra note 150, at 23 & n.13.
152. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 781.
153. Appellee's Brief, supra note 150, at 23 n.13 (citing Limerick Ecology Action v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719, 729 (1989)).
154. Appellee's Brief, supra note 150, at 25.
155. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10.
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in Pacific Legal Foundation, needed a rule similar to functional
equivalence, but not the same as functional equivalence, because the Sec-
retary did not place functional equivalence at issue. Subsequent litigants
opposed to the displacement rule could capitalize on this tenuous distinc-
tion when advancing a position like the County's-that the displacement
rule is nothing more than a restatement of the functional equivalence rule.
Although one may attack the displacement rule on grounds that it is a
restatement of the functional equivalence rule, the fact remains that the
Ninth Circuit affirmatively advanced the displacement exemption, and that
the Supreme Court allowed the decision to stand." 6
C. How Will the Displacement Exemption Affect the Future Practice of
NEPA Law?
The purpose served by the displacement exemption will depend on
how it is used by litigants and how it is controlled by courts. First, liti-
gants may find a procedural advantage with the displacement exemption;
its application in Douglas County implies that a party seeking NEPA
exemption that neglects to raise the functional equivalence argument may
be saved if it presents legislative history sufficient to warrant a finding
that Congress intended to exempt a certain act from NEPA.
Second, litigants may find a substantive advantage with the displace-
ment exemption. The holding implies that legislative history may warrant
a finding of congressional intent to displace NEPA's procedures with
those of another statute if the litigant can show the existence of the requi-
site Merrellisms, which are: the statute in question is an "environment-
enhancing" statute, it arose out of a "compromise" between legitimate
competing interests, and it represents Congress' choice to "carefully craft"
an effective solution to a problem by amending the statute in question,
rather than requiring NEPA compliance.
When litigants attempt to utilize this substantive advantage of the
displacement exemption, it will necessarily be up to the courts to control
the misuse of legislative history and the Merrell test. This is a formidable
task for any court because it requires not only time and energy to
exhaustively research the legislative history, but an evaluation of each
litigant's interpretation of the legislative history. Making such an evalua-
tion is a problem because legislative history is malleable and can be char-
acterized to suit many needs."5 7
One need only to look as far as the instant case to see the problem of
156. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 116 S. Ct 698 (1996).
157. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
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evaluating legislative history. The County argued that the legislative histo-
ry of the ESA was not comparable to that of FIFRA."58 To support its
assertion, the County cited a committee report for the 1978 amendments to
the ESA requiring that "actual notice of the critical habitat designation and
'any environmental assessment or impact statement' be supplied to affect-
ed local governments." '159 The court addressed this piece of history by
ruling that the statement did not affirmatively require preparation of an
EIS, but simply stated that if an EIS was available it should be
forwarded.'" The court concluded that because the language did not
become part of the final statute, and in light of the rest of the legislative
history, the committee report cited by the County was not indicative of
congressional intent.'6'
This Note does not suggest that the court's evaluation of legislative
history and congressional intent is erroneous or unjustified; indeed, the
court undertook a competent, considered review of the legislative history
to support its holding. However, the inherent pitfall of using legislative
history to buttress legal arguments is that there are no guidelines for dis-
cerning "good" legislative records from "bad" ones, or for placing more
value on one litigant's interpretation of legislative history over
another's.'62 Without such guidelines, judges inevitably construe legisla-
tive history as they wish, "lead[ing] to a jurisprudence in which statutory
words become devalued."'63 This sets a dangerous precedent as it not
only opens the door to litigants' manipulation of NEPA, but also under-
mines Congress' power in creating effective legislation.'64
It is doubtful Congress intended the numerous NEPA exemptions that
courts have interpreted under the rubric of congressional intent. Reluctant
to actually speak for Congress, courts in the past have refrained from
relying on congressional intent as a basis for their opinions with the hope
of sending a message to Congress to affirmatively state its position on a
particular matter."' Perhaps the Douglas County court should have fol-
lowed suit. In a sense, the court has "opened the floodgates" and has
placed on the shoulders of the lower courts the heavy burden of scruti-
nizing legislative history every time a new case involving the displacement
158. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504.
159. Id. (quoting H. CoNF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9494).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Easterbrook, supra note 157, at 61-62.
163. Easterbrook, supra note 157, at 62.
164. See Easterbrook, supra note 157, at 65 ("[T]he search for these elusive intents so liberates
judges that they become the law-givers in fact.").
165. See Easterbrook, supra note 157, at 66-67.
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exemption appears.
V. CONCLUSION
The Douglas County decision may initially draw cheers from environ-
mentalists and champions of efficient government. The Secretary's efforts
to protect the environment by designating critical habitat for endangered
species will no longer be hindered by what some consider needless and
wasteful duplication of government documents.
However, as this Note suggests, the Douglas County decision could
backfire and prove to be environmentalists' worst enemy. NEPA propo-
nents risk the possibility that federal actions actually harmful to the envi-
ronment will meet the Merrell test and be granted NEPA exemption. A
further problem is the possibility that the multiple granting of NEPA ex-
emptions will erode NEPA, rendering it ineffective for accomplishing its
purpose of protecting the environment. The appropriate question might be:
Is risking the eventual loss of NEPA's environmental protection policy
worth the short-term gain of allowing the Secretary to proceed with criti-
cal habitat designation without preparing an EIS, thereby reducing "need-
less" duplication of government documents? It will be the courts' task to
control misuse of the displacement exemption and to ensure that in seem-
ingly taking one step forward, we do not end up taking two steps back.
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